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Abstract 
We analyse the performance of simple investment strategies in IPOs based on a large sample 
of IPOs in Germany between 1985 and 2002. In particular, we compare the performance of 
the following strategies: Invest equally weighted in each IPO, invest market value weighted in 
each IPO, invest in an equally weighted portfolio of recent IPOs or invest in a value weighted 
portfolio of recent IPOs. We find that investors pursuing the first two investment strategies 
would realise significantly negative abnormal returns on average. In contrast, applying a 
bootstrapping procedure, we find that investing according to the latter two investment 
strategies does not yield significant underperformance. The difference in performance among 
investment strategies points to the phenomenon that firms going public in hot IPO markets 
perform worse than those going public in cold markets. We analyse to what extent this 
phenomenon can be attributed to pseudo market timing. Based on simulations, our results 
indicate that pseudo market timing can partly explain the performance of IPO investment 
strategies between 1996 and 2002. 
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1 Introduction 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) frequently attract a lot of public attention due to extensive 
marketing and broad media coverage. In particular, IPOs often serve as a “gateway drug” to 
the stock market for private investors. For example, large IPOs like those of Deutsche 
Telekom AG and Deutsche Post AG initiated individual investors’ stock investments in 
Germany in many cases. Consequently, it is worth asking how investments in German IPOs 
performed on average. Indeed, subsequent to the seminal study by Ritter (1991), numerous 
studies investigated the long-run performance of IPOs in different countries including 
Germany. Many of them found significant underperformance of IPOs, an observation that 
prompted Loughran and Ritter (1995) to claim „Investing in firms issuing stock is hazardous 
to your wealth”. However, most of the literature focuses on the implications of 
underperformance for market efficiency (e.g., see Fama (1998)). Little research is done 
explicitly on the performance of different investment strategies in IPOs. In this paper, we 
discuss the performance of four simple IPO investment strategies. In addition, we analyse to 
what extent the pseudo market timing theory proposed by Schultz (2003) is able to explain 
differences in performance among IPO investment strategies.  
An obvious way to invest in IPOs is to purchase shares of each firm that goes public and to 
sell those shares after a certain holding period. The length of the holding period may be 
chosen arbitrarily subject to the individual perception of when an IPO firm turns to be an 
established publicly listed company. In this study, we focus on holding periods of three and 
five years. Depending on the capital invested in each IPO, we can distinguish two sub 
strategies. On the one hand, an investor might want to invest the same amount of capital in 
each IPO (strategy 1 hereafter). On the other hand, an investor might want to acquire the same 
proportion of each IPO’s market value (strategy 2 hereafter). Throughout this study, we refer 
to this family of investment strategies as “each-IPO investment strategies”. With an each-IPO 
investment strategy, the capital invested varies with IPO activity. Thus, these strategies 
implicitly assume that investors do not face a budget constraint. The uncertainty about the 
capital needs is amplified in case of strategy 2. Here, capital needs fluctuate not only with IPO 
activity but also with variance in the market value of firms going public. We analyse the 
performance of these investment strategies in comparison to simultaneous investments in an 
equally weighted and a market value weighted broad market portfolio in Germany between 
1985 and 2002. In order to realise excess returns, investors would have to sell the benchmark 
portfolio when investing in an IPO and to repurchase the benchmark portfolio from the 
proceeds of the IPO sale at the end of the holding period. For simplicity, we assume that 
investors make their investment decision at the end of each calendar month.  
An alternative to investing in each IPO is to invest in a portfolio that comprises firms that 
went public recently. Again, the definition of recently is arbitrary subject to the individual 
perception of when an IPO firm turns to be an established publicly listed company. We refer IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  2 
 
                                                
to the period of time in which newly listed companies are considered in the IPO portfolio as 
formation period. As with holding periods, we focus on formation periods of three and five 
years. As with strategies 1 and 2, we can distinguish between two sub strategies with respect 
to the weighting of each firm in the portfolio. On the one hand, an investor might want to 
weight each IPO equally (strategy 3). On the other hand, an investor might want to weight 
each IPO according to its market value (strategy 4). In contrast to strategies 1 and 2, there is 
no uncertainty about the capital invested as investors decide about the investment amount 
only once at the beginning of the investment period. Afterwards, purchases of new IPOs and 
sales of former IPOs are considered by rebalancing the IPO portfolio. In compliance with 
strategies 1 and 2, we assume that investors revise their IPO portfolio at the end of each 
calendar month. In case of strategy 3, this implies portfolio rebalancing whenever newly listed 
firms are included or former IPO firms are excluded. It implies mandatory monthly 
rebalancing in case of strategy 4.  
Frequent portfolio rebalancing is associated with considerable transaction costs in practice. 
Such transaction costs question the feasibility of investment strategies 3 and 4 for individual 
investors. However, individual investors could easily implement these investment strategies if 
there existed investment funds or certificates that emulate such an IPO portfolio. To our 
knowledge, there are two certificates available to private investors in Germany that resemble 
an IPO portfolio. The „IPO-Select Basket Zertifikat“ issued by Sal. Oppenheim represents a 
portfolio of selected European IPOs.1 An opportunity to invest into a portfolio of firms that 
went public in Germany within the last ten years is provided by certificates on the German 
Entrepreneurial Index (GEX®). Again, the GEX® only comprises a selection of German 
IPOs as there are criteria for incorporation in this index other than an IPO within the last ten 
years.2 
We calculate the performance of all investment strategies by the very same monthly returns of 
the IPOs and the benchmarks, respectively. Thus, any difference in performance among 
strategies must be due to the different methods of aggregating monthly returns implied by the 
different investment strategies. We find that investments in IPOs according to strategies 1 and 
2 underperform compared to investments in the benchmark portfolios. According to a 
skewness-adjusted test statistic, this underperformance is highly significant in most cases. 
Strategies 3 and 4 yield underperformance, too. However, applying a bootstrapping 
methodology, we do not find significant underperformance. These results imply that firms 
going public in periods of high IPO activity perform worse than firms going public at other 
times. A popular explanation for worse IPO performance in “hot” IPO markets is Market 
Timing. Market Timing states that managers or owners take their firms public if markets 
 
1   Vgl. Sal. Oppenheim (2006). IPO firms may be included in the basket within the first year after the going 
public. No information is given on the time IPO firms may stay in the basket. 
2   Apart from a going public within the last ten years, firms are incorporated in the GEX® only if the owners 
are active managers of the firm, too. For further information see Achleitner/Kaserer/Moldenhauer (2005). IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  3 
 
                                                
overvalue IPOs. Underperformance emerges if the markets learn about the firm’s true value 
subsequent to the IPO.  
However, Schultz (2003) provides a rational explanation for worse IPO performance in hot 
markets which he calls Pseudo Market Timing.1 This explanation is based on the assumption 
that IPO activity rises with market prices and especially with prices of recent IPOs as 
managers’ or owners’ willingness to go public increases with potential IPO proceeds 
irrespective of their ability to predict future market returns. Consequently, IPO activity will 
peak at market peaks. As we explain in detail in section 3.1, this results in long-run 
underperformance on average if returns of recent IPOs are positively correlated in a calendar 
month. Note that this theory does not require that markets overvalue IPOs at some periods in 
time. In a second part of our study, we use simulations in order to analyse the power of this 
theory to explain the significant underperformance of the invest-in-each-IPO-strategies in 
Germany. Here, we proceed as follows: First, we apply regression analysis to test the relation 
between IPO activity and price levels in our sample. Second, we construct an ex ante efficient 
capital market. The expected return of this market and the variance of IPO returns to market 
returns are estimated by real market and IPO returns in our sample. We simulate the 
performance of this market in our sample period 50,000 times. For each market simulation, 
we generate IPO activity according to the regression function estimated in step one. Finally, 
we calculate the performance of our IPO investments strategies in each market simulation. 
Averaging over 50,000 simulations yields expected performance of IPO investment strategies. 
We find that Pseudo Market Timing can explain parts of the performance differences in IPO 
investment strategies between 1985 and 2002. Its explanatory power is considerably greater 
for the IPOs between 1996 and 2002 than for those between 1985 and 2002. 
This paper adds to the literature on German IPOs in several ways. Firstly, we focus on 
differences in performance among investment strategies involving IPOs. While investment 
strategies 1 and 2 resemble the methodology of event studies on the long-run performance of 
IPOs, strategies 3 and 4 have not been studied systematically on German IPOs yet. Taking 
budget restrictions of investors into account, strategies 3 and 4 are more feasible. Recent 
product innovations like Sal. Oppenheim’s “IPO-Select Basket Zertifikat” or certificates on 
the GEX® suggest the relevance of these investment strategies. We study the performance of 
IPO investment strategies on the basis of a large sample including all German IPOs between 
1985 and 2002. To control for institutional changes in Germany’s primary capital markets and 
an evolution of equity culture since the mid-1990, we divide our sample period into sub 
samples comprising 1985 to 1995 and 1996 to 2002, respectively. Secondly, we discuss 
Pseudo Market Timing as a rationale explanation of differences in performance among IPO 
investment strategies in Germany. Thereby, we complement the literature on rationales for 
 
1   Miller (1977) provides an alternative rational explanation based on heterogeneous expectations. Here, we 
focus on the pseudo market timing explanation.  IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  4 
 
long-run underperformance of IPOs in Germany that is dominated by behavioural 
explanations so far. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methodology, briefly 
reviews the literature on long-run performance of IPOs in Germany and analyses the 
performance of the IPO investment strategies described above. Section 3 introduces Pseudo 
Market Timing as a rationale for differences in performance of IPO investment strategies and 
discusses the explanatory power of Pseudo Market Timing for the performance differences 
observed among investment strategies in Germany. Section 4 summarises and concludes. 
 IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  5 
 
                                                
2  Performance of IPO investment strategies in Germany 
2.1  Data and Methodology 
We study the long-run performance of IPOs in Germany from 1985 to 2002. In addition to the 
analysis of the entire sample period, we take a separate look on the sub-periods 1985 to 1995 
and 1996 to 2002, respectively. The rationales for this division are changes in the institutional 
environment for IPOs and changes in the German equity culture from the mid-1990s onwards. 
The institutional framework for IPOs changed with the shift from fixed-price offerings to 
book-building in 1996 as well as with the establishment of the “Neuer Markt” in Frankfurt in 
1997. In June 1996, Eurobike AG was the first German firm to go public via the book-
building procedure. This mechanism allows IPO pricing closer to the market as the offer price 
set based on market demand. 443 companies went public via bookbuilding following the IPO 
of Eurobike AG till the end of 2002, compared to only 25 firms using a fixed-price offering in 
the same time period.1 The Neuer Markt provided a platform for small and medium size firms 
with high growth potential willing to enter the stock exchange. It soon attracted the attention 
of both these firms and the public. 292 companies went public on the Neuer Markt between its 
establishment and its closure in June 2003. In the same time, only 165 companies went public 
on other segments of the German stock exchange. The Neuer Markt thus remarkably 
accelerated the establishment of an equity culture in Germany. Apart from the Neuer Markt, 
the German equity culture evolved from the IPO of Deutsche Telekom AG in November 
1996.2 With an issue volume of 19.7 billion Deutsche Mark (10.1 billion €), this IPO 
outnumbered all previous IPOs in Germany by far. Deutsche Telekom shares were marketed 
intensively in the media and presented to the public as people’s shares („Volksaktien“). This 
caused a strong interest of private investors in this IPO. The finance minister at the time, Theo 
Waigel, characterised the impact the Deutsche Telekom IPO as follows: „The privatisation of 
Deutsche Telekom AG is associated with crucial impulses to the stimulation of the financial 
market and the popularisation of shares […].“3 The favourable performance of the „T-Aktie“ 
until 2000 nourished a continuing interest of private investors and the media in IPOs. 
 
1   „Trius AG“ went public via a uniform price auction on May 9, 2000.  
2    Anecdotal evidence for the evolution of equity culture is provided by the IPO’s media coverage, e.g.: 
Borggreve (1995), Borggreve/Dobrikat (1995) or Kutzer (1997). For a detailed illustration of the Deutsche 
Telekom IPO see Reuschenbach (2000). 
3    This quote was taken from Kutzer (1995). The original quote was in German: “Die Privatisierung der 
Deutschen Telekom AG ist mit entscheidenden Impulsen für die Belebung des Finanzmarkts und die 
Popularisierung der Aktie verbunden […].” IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  6 
 
                                                
From the new issue database of Deutsches Aktieninstitut e. V. and the website of Deutsche 
Börse AG we identified 667 IPOs in Germany between 1985 and 2002. Closing prices and 
market values on the last trading days of the 61 months following each IPO, the benchmark 
performance in the respective months as well information on dividends and other payments 
are provided by Thomson Financial Datastream and the financial database Karlsruher 
Kapitalmarktdatenbank. Information not provided by these databases is collected from the 
financial sections of the daily newspapers Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Handelsblatt. 
As we ceased collecting market prices in August 2005, we do not have 61 months time series 
for each IPO in the sample. Based on the monthly data, we calculate the total return per 
calendar month for each firm assuming that dividend payments and other cash distributions 
are reinvested in the firm’s shares. Due to the calculation of returns based on end of calendar 
month prices, the first monthly total return is available for the month following the IPO 
month. This procedure implies that investors take their investment decisions at the end of each 
month in case of strategies 1 and 2. Accordingly, investors rebalance their IPO portfolios at 
the end of each month in case of strategies 3 and in case of 4 if necessary. Summarising, at the 
end of each month investors put money in those companies which went public in this very 
month.1  
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics on the IPOs in our sample and in the sub samples. 
Between 1985 and 2002, an average of 3.09 companies went public per month. Comparing 
the first and the second sub-period reveals that the average issuance activity has tripled since 
1996. The mean market capitalisation of firms going public in the second sub period was 
more than twice as high as in the first sub period. In all sample periods, market capitalisation 
considerably varies among IPOs and the median size is about a quarter of mean size. The 
latter observation indicates that mean IPO size is driven by few very large issues. The largest 
IPO in the sample is that of T-Online AG in April 2000. After five years, quotes of 38 new 
issues had been ceased, out of which 16 had filed for bankruptcy, 19 had been acquired and 3 
had been merged with other companies. Insolvencies as well as mergers and acquisitions are 
predominantly a phenomenon of the IPOs between 1996 and 2002. In fact, 30 of the 38 firms 
subject to insolvency, mergers or acquisitions went public in 1999 or 2000. The subsequent 
downturn of stock prices prompted these firms to engage in takeover activities which is 
reflected by a mean time between the IPO and such activities of slightly above three years. 
The fact that the time between IPO and insolvency is about three and a half years indicates 
that firms that did not engage in takeover activities successfully failed subsequently. 
The firms which had filed for bankruptcy remain in the sample for five years to avoid 
distortions owing to survivorship bias (e.g., see Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross 
(1992)). In case of mergers and acquisitions, we assume investors behave as follows: Mergers 
 
1   Alternatively, if investors would receive allocations in each IPO, the success of the investment strategies 
could be analysed on the basis of issue prices, thereby including underpricing. However, as investors may not 
receive an allocation in case of oversubscription, such an investment strategy would involve allocation risk. IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  7 
 
have to be approved by investors in the shareholders’ meeting. Thus, if an IPO firm merges 
with a second firm to a new entity, we assume that investors convert their shares into those of 
the new entity. The IPO firm’s time series of returns is therefore complemented by the returns 
of the new entity subsequent to the merger. In the case of acquisitions, however, investors’ 
behaviour is less obvious. If the IPO firm is acquired by purchasing its shares in the market, 
investors selling shares receive cash payments. If the acquiring company suggests an 
exchange of shares, the IPO firm’s investors can either agree or obtain an cash compensation 
at the time of the delisting. For reasons of simplicity, we assume that investors prefer cash 
compensations in any case. This cash compensation or the cash payment in return for selling 
shares is invested in the benchmark portfolio. Thus, the relative abnormal performance at the 
time of the acquisition is preserved in the time series. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on the IPO sample 
Market capitalisation is calculated on the basis of the closing price of the last trading day of the IPO month. 
The number of mergers, acquisitions and insolvencies within 60 months after the IPO and the mean number of 
months after IPOs are calculated on the basis of the delisting dates. 
      85-02    85-95    96-02 
Total number of IPOs  667    196    471 
Number of IPOs per month              
   Mean  3.09    1.48    5.61 
   Median  1.00    1.00    2.50 
Market capitalisation [€ million]              
   Mean  538.86    245.75    660.84 
   Median  136.21    76.49    162.66 
   Min  1.96    2.70    1.96 
   Max  45429.96    8037.50    45429.96 
Mergers (up to 60 months after IPO)              
   Number  3    0    3 
   Mean number of months after IPO  39    N/A    39 
Acquisitions (up to 60 months after IPO)              
   Number  19    2    17 
   Mean number of months after IPO  38.2    38.4    37 
Insolvencies (up to 60 months after IPO)              
   Number  16    2    14 
   Mean number of months after IPO  43.2    50.5    42.3 
 
Choosing an appropriate benchmark portfolio is a delicate task as it may significantly alter 
results. Generally, the benchmark portfolio’s risk profile should correspond to the risk profile 
of the IPO sample. A broad market index seems to be a self-evident benchmark portfolio to a 
large sample of IPOs. However, IPO firms may systematically differ from the market in terms 
of risk characteristics as IPO firms tend to be young growth firms with low market values. IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  8 
 
                                                
Ignoring this difference may yield incorrect estimates for the abnormal performance of IPOs.1 
Thus, Brav and Gompers (1997), Ritter and Welch (2002) and others point out that IPOs 
should be compared to benchmark portfolios of firms with similar market values and similar 
market-to-book ratios.2 Loughran and Ritter (1999) mention benchmark contamination as 
another obstacle when choosing a benchmark portfolio: If IPO firms are constituents of the 
benchmark portfolio, too, the estimate for abnormal performance will be biased downwards. 
Comparing IPO firms to benchmark portfolios adjusted for size and market-to-book ratios and 
avoiding benchmark contamination at the same time causes practical problems for the 
German market and adds subjectivity to the analysis. A broad market index, however, should 
be least affected by benchmark contamination. 
We test the long-run performance of new issues in comparison to the value weighted 
Composite DAX® (CDAX hereafter) and the equally weighted version of the “Deutscher 
Aktien-Forschungsindex” (DAFOX). The CDAX is a broad market index that contains all 
firms listed on the market segments “Amtlicher Handel” or “Geregelter Markt”. The equally 
weighted DAFOX (ewDAFOX) comprises all stocks listed on the Amtlicher Handel (see 
Göppl and Schütz (1995) for details). As the focus of our analysis is on differences in 
performance among IPO strategies rather than on the absolute level of abnormal performance, 
a potential loss of accuracy due to the choice of broad market benchmark portfolios does not 
affect our main results. Further, comparing the equal weighting strategies 1 and 3 to the 
ewDAFOX and the value weighting strategies to the CDAX allows controlling for potential 
size effects in parts.  
2.2 Empirical  results of previous studies 
Table 2 presents results of selected studies concerning the long-run performance of IPOs in 
Germany.3 In all studies, abnormal returns are calculated in event time methodology which 
implies that each IPO is weighted equally. This resembles the each-IPO investment strategy 1 
proposed in this study. Regarding methodology, a majority of studies applies the Buy-and-
 
1   It is not entirely certain if small firms are systematically over- or undervalued. The „size-effect“ found by 
Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) for the first time states that low market value firms generate significant 
excess returns on a risk adjusted basis. Stehle (1997) proved the existence of a „size-effect“ on the German 
capital market. In the years following its discovery, however, the size-effect seemingly has disappeared 
(Schwert (2003)). Brav/Gompers (1997) as well as Brav/Geczy/Gompers (2000), however, observe the 
relatively poor long-term development of small new issues compared to the total market. They find no 
significant abnormal performance when comparing these IPOs with firms similar in size and market-to-book 
ratio. 
2   For instance, Ritter/Welch (2002) provide evidence for negative excess of US IPOs between 1980 and 2001 
amounting to -23.4% compared to a market index but only to -5.1% compared to a portfolio of matching 
firms with similar market values and similar market-to-book ratios.  
3   For more detailed literature overviews see e.g. Stehle/Ehrhardt (1999), p. 1412 as well as Stehle/Ehrhardt/ 
Przyborowsky (2000). IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  9 
 
Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) method to measure long-run abnormal performance. We 
discuss the calculation methods in the following sections. The results of the literature are 
mixed. Until the early 1990s, the majority of studies does not provide evidence for significant 
positive or negative abnormal returns of German IPOs after holding periods of three years. 
Studies by Ehrhardt (1997), Stehle and Ehrhardt (1999) and Stehle/Ehrhardt/Przyborowsky 
(2000) compare returns of IPOs with those of equally weighted and market value weighted 
portfolios of shares with similar market capitalisation. The latter find significant abnormal 
returns neither in comparison to equally weighted and market value-weighted market 
portfolios nor in comparison to benchmark firms with marginally higher or lower market 
capitalisation.  
Table 2: Studies on the long-run performance of IPOs in Germany 
*/**/***: statistically significant on a 10%-/5%-/1%-level; AH: Amtlicher Handel; NM: Neuer Markt; ew: equally 
weighted; mvw: market value weighted; 
a) Benchmark firm’s market value slightly above IPO firm’s market value; 
b) 
Benchmark firm’s market value slightly below IPO firm’s market value; BHAR: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return; WR: 
Wealth Relative; CAR: Cumulative Abnormal Return. 
Author(s) (year)  Sample 
period 
Number of 








Ehrhardt (1997)  1960-1990  159  Size-portfolio (ew)  36  -0.6    BHAR 
      159  Size-portfolio (mvw.)  36  -3.8    BHAR 
Ljungqvist (1997)  1970-1990  189  mvwDAFOX  36  -12.1  *  WR 
Stehle/Ehrhardt (1999)  1960-1992  187  Size-portfolio (ew)  36  -5.0    BHAR 
         Size-portfolio (mvw)  36  1.5    BHAR 
Sapusek (2000)  1983-1993  142   Benchmark firms (by size) 60  -34.7    CAR 
         DAX  60  1.8    CAR 
Stehle/Ehrhardt/   1960-1992  187  Market portfolio (ew)  36  -5.0    BHAR 
Przyborowsky (2000)        Market portfolio (mvw)  36  1.54    BHAR 
      Benchmark firms 
a)  36  -11.6    BHAR 
         Benchmark firms 
b)  36  -3.4    BHAR 
Gerke/Fleischer (2001)  1997-2000  263 (NM)  Nemax All-Share  12  96.6  ***  BHAR 
Rehkugler/Schenek 
(2001)  1983-1996  450   CDAX  36  -8.5    CAR 
Mager (2001)  1987-1997  152   ewDAFOX  36  -13.5    CAR 
        60  -41.3  **  CAR 
Neuhaus/Schremper   1995-2000  27 (AH)  CDAX  36  -31.8  **  BHAR 
(2003)    25 (NM)  CDAX  36  -72.9  ***  BHAR 
Rath/Tebroke/Tietze 
(2004)  1997-2001  301 (NM)  CDAX  36  -87.8  ***  BHAR 
Lubig (2004)  1997-2002  326 (NM)  Nemax All-Share  24  5.0    BHAR 
 
Ljungqvist (1997), however, detects long-run underperformance of IPOs to the broad market 
index DAFOX which is significant on a 10%-level.1 Sapusek’s (2000) analysis of the 
performance of IPOs after up to five years shows significant negative abnormal returns in 
                                                 
1   Stehle/Ehrhardt (1999) partly attribute the negative abnormal returns in comparison to the DAFOX found by 
Ljungqvist (1997) to the chosen methodology. See Stehle/Ehrhardt (1999), p. 1408 for details. IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  10 
 
comparison to benchmark firms as well as to the equally-weighted DAFOX. Rehkugler and 
Schenek (2001) as well as Mager (2001) examine the performance of German IPOs in the 
1980s and 1990s. While Rehkugler and Schenek find negative, but non-significant abnormal 
returns, Mager (2001) observes significant negative abnormal returns in comparison to the 
ewDAFOX after five years, but not after three years. 
Some more recent studies analyse the long-run performance of IPOs on the Neuer Markt in 
Frankfurt. Gerke and Fleischer (2001) find significant positive abnormal returns for holding 
periods of one year. Lubig (2004) does not find evidence for significant abnormal returns of 
Neuer Markt-IPOs if each IPO is held for two years. In these studies the Nemax All-Share 
index is chosen as benchmark portfolio. As the Nemax All-Share comprised all firms listed at 
the Neuer Markt, the results mentioned above suffer from benchmark contamination. In 
effect, these studies test the performance of later IPOs to early IPOs on the Neuer Markt. 
Neuhaus and Schremper (2003) and Rath, Tebroke and Tietze (2004) compare returns of IPOs 
at Neuer Markt to the CDAX. They detect significant negative abnormal returns three years 
after the IPOs. Studies of IPOs on the Neuer Markt point at the influence of the length of the 
holding period on long-run performance. In particular, the longer the holding period, the 
worse the performance compared to the respective benchmarks. In general, the empirical 
results of previous studies underline the sensitivity of IPO abnormal performance to variations 
in the sample period, the choice of the benchmark portfolio and the length of the holding 
period. As regards the sample periods, significant underperformance is predominantly found 
for IPOs in the 1990s and for IPOs on Neuer Markt in particular. Regarding the holding 
period, underperformance rises with an increasing holding period. 
There are few studies resembling IPO investment strategies 2 in Germany. For instance, Kiss 
and Stehle (2002) study the performance of Neuer Markt IPOs in case of equally and value 
weighting each IPO. They find that strategy 2 performs similar to strategy 1 if each IPO is 
held for one year. To our knowledge, strategies 3 and 4 have not been analysed in Germany 
yet. However, there is some international evidence on strategies 2 and 3. Brav and Gompers 
(1997) find long-run underperformance on average in the USA if each IPO is value weighted. 
Gompers/Lerner (2003) and Schultz (2003) find no underperformance of US IPOs if each 
calendar month is weighted equally. In contrast, Loughran and Ritter (1995) detect long-run 
negative returns in calendar time for US IPOs. 
2.3  Each-IPO investment strategies 
We study the performance of an investment in each IPO by comparing the buy-and-hold 
return of each IPO to the buy-and-hold benchmark return irrespective of the IPO point in 
calendar time. As we ignore calendar time, this analysis resembles an event study 
methodology. Several different approaches to measuring long-term performance of stocks in 
event time are discussed in the literature. Among the most established methodologies are the 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return approach (BHAR) firstly mentioned by Cusatis, Miles and IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  11 
 
)
Woolridge (1993), the Cumulative Abnormal Return approach (CARs) by Fama et al. (1969) 
and the Wealth Relative method by Ritter (1991).  
The BHAR-method calculates the equally or value weighted mean of differences between the 
buy-and-hold return of an IPO and the buy-and-hold benchmark return. The BHARH,i of firm i 
exhibiting a total return Ri,t in calendar month t following the IPO versus the total return of a 
benchmark portfolio RB,i,t for firm i in calendar month t for a maximum holding period H is 
calculated as 
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The mean of the buy-and-hold abnormal returns  of i = 1…N IPOs in the sample is 
calculated in case of investment strategies S={1,2} as 
i H BHAR ,
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where 
wi = 1/N in case of investment strategy 1 and  
wi = market value of firm i at the end of the IPO month / sum of market values of all 
firms at the end of the respective IPO months in case of investment strategy 2. 
In order to draw statistical inference on abnormal performance of IPOs in investment 
strategies 1 and 2, we test the null hypothesis  0 : H0 H BHAR =
S
 to the alternative hypothesis 
0 : H ≠
S
BHAR
                                                
H A . As monthly IPO and benchmark returns are combined multiplicatively, the 
distributions of buy-and-hold returns of the IPOs and of the benchmarks are right-skewed. We 
obtain a right-skewed distribution of the buy-and-hold abnormal returns  , too. As a 
consequence, standard t-statistics for hypotheses tests are inefficient. We apply a transformed 
t-statistic proposed by Hall (1992). This statistic allows efficient hypotheses tests even in case 
of severely skewed distributions.1 
i H BHAR ,
According to the CAR-method monthly returns of the IPOs and the benchmark portfolio are 
not combined multiplicatively but additively. Due to the additive cumulation the distribution 
of CARs is expected to be less skewed than the distribution of BHARs. To measure the result 
of investment strategies 1 and 2 this methodology is less suitable since the additive 
 
1   Lyon/Barber/Tsai (1999) suggest a bootstrapped version of Johnson’s (1978) transformed t-statistic. 
However, Hall (1992) applies simulations to demonstrate that his transformed t-statistic is more efficient than 
the one suggested by Johnson (1978) as the latter does not fully adjust for skewness.  IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  12 
 
combination of returns implies an equal weighting of monthly returns. This, in turn, requires 
monthly rebalancing of each IPO which is not intended for investment strategies 1 and 2.1  
Stehle and Ehrhardt (1999) as well as Jakobsen and Sørensen (2001) argue that the “Wealth 
Relative“-method (WR) is appropriate for measuring the long-term performance of IPOs. 
Here, the monthly returns of the IPOs and the benchmark portfolios are combined 
multiplicatively like in formula (1) to determine buy-and-hold returns of the IPOs and the 
benchmarks. However, the abnormal performance is measured by the ratio of IPO buy-and-
hold-returns to benchmark buy-and-hold returns. Thus, the WRs express the relative 
performance of IPOs to their benchmark portfolios. Based on a sample of Danish IPOs, 
Jakobsen and Sørensen (2001) show that WRs are log-normal distributed. The log-WRs are 
hence an appropriate basis for significance tests. For two reasons we prefer the BHAR-
method to the WR-method. First, we deal with skewed distributions by testing significance on 
the basis of a skewness-adjusted test statistic. Second, the success of the investment strategies 
cannot easily be interpreted economically if measured by WRs. Though the WR-method 
answers the question of the mean relative performance of IPOs to their benchmarks and 
thereby indicates out- or underperformance, by its nature the method does not allow drawing 
conclusions on average monetary wealth gains. In contrast, mean BHARs can easily be 
interpreted as mean wealth gains or losses in percentage points of the capital invested.  
Table 3 exhibits the 
S
H BHAR  of investment strategies 1 and 2 for holding periods of three and 
five years compared to the CDAX and the ewDAFOX in the sample and sub sample periods. 
At the end of the sample periods, all IPO investments are liquidated irrespective of the time 
elapsed since the going public.2 We observe non-significant outperformance in case of an 
equally weighted investment in IPO firms between 1985 and 1995 with holding periods of 36 
months. All other variations of investment strategies 1 and 2 underperform the benchmark. 
The magnitude of the underperformance varies between and within the two strategies 
depending on the sample period, the holding period and the benchmark portfolio. Firstly, we 
take a closer look at the performance of the equally weighted strategy 1. It is remarkable that 
strategy 1 performs considerably worse with 60 months holding periods than with 36 months 
holding periods irrespective of the sample period and the benchmark. According to the p-
values of the skewness adjusted t-statistic, the underperformance for three year holding 
                                                 
1   The appropriateness of these and other performance measures for analyzing the long-run performance of 
IPOs in general is discussed in detail in Stehle/Ehrhardt (1999). 
2   Consequently, the average holding period of IPOs in the sample periods is lower than 36 months and 60 
months, respectively. In case of the entire sample period, the average holding period amount to 33.7 and to 
45.6 months, respectively. The average holding periods in the sub sample period 1985 to 1995 amount to 
30.9 and 48.0 months, respectively, while in the sub sample period 1996 to 2002 they amount to 32.8 and 
39.7 months, respectively. In an analysis not presented in this paper, we analyse the performance of strategies 
1 and 2 if the IPO investments may be held up to December 2004. This raises the averages holding period 
close to 36 and 60 months. In this analysis we observe even worse underperformance in any case. However, 
the significance levels as well as the patterns of abnormal returns with respect to the benchmark, the holding 
period and the sample period do not differ from the results reported here.  IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  13 
 
periods is not significant, whereas the underperformance for five year holding periods is 
highly significant except for the first sub sample period in comparison to the CDAX. The 
separation of the sample period into the sub samples 1985 to 1995 and 1996 to 2002 reveals 
that investment strategy 1 performs substantially worse in the second sub sample. In the first 
sub sample, statistically significant underperformance can only be found compared to the 
ewDAFOX with a holding period of 60 months.1 Irrespective of holding period and sample 
period, mean BHARs are lower compared to the value weighted CDAX than compared to the 
equally weighted ewDAFOX. This points to a relative out-performance of the ewDAFOX 
compared to the CDAX in the average calendar time holding period. In turn, this implies that 
firms predominantly went public prior to periods in which small firms outperformed large 
firms. 
Table 3: Strategy 1 and 2 mean BHARs for holding periods of 36 and 60 months 
Holding periods of 36 and 60 months indicate maximum holding periods as each IPO investment is liquidated 
at the end of the sample periods (1995 and 2002, respectively). BHAR is calculated according to expression 
(2). Italic figures below BHARs are p-values of skewness-adjusted t-statistics according to Hall (1992). P-
values of strategy 2 BHARs are calculated by duplicating BHARs based on the market value at the end of the 
IPO month. The number of duplications is determined by the number of 10 million € pieces of market value 
exceeding a market value of 10 million €. 
           Strategy 1    Strategy 2 
Benchmark portfolio  CDAX    ewDAFOX    CDAX     ewDAFOX 
Holding period    36  60    36  60    36  60     36  60 
85-02  BHAR    -4.87%  -30.29%    -15.59%  -44.05%    -6.07%  -29.98%     -18.98%  -48.74% 
N =   667  p-value    0.8798  0.0000    0.5384  0.0004    0.0000  0.0000     0.0000  0.0000 
85-95  BHAR    2.80%  -6.91%    -5.93%  -14.79%    -13.28%  -20.74%     -17.33%  -24.68% 
N =   196  p-value  0.5144  0.2094    0.1973  0.0068    0.0000  0.0000     0.0000  0.0000 
96-02  BHAR 
 
  -3.51%  -28.86%    -18.61%  -53.63%    -3.89%  -26.11%     -3.95%  -26.19% 
N =   471  p-value    0.9895  0.0000    0.5992  0.0000    0.0012  0.0000     0.0005  0.0000 
 
Investment strategy 2 results in similar underperformance when investing over the whole 
sample period. Again, holding each IPO for 60 months considerably increases 
underperformance. In contrast to strategy 1, however, IPOs significantly underperform the 
benchmark for the 36-months holding period, too. A comparison of the first and the second 
sample period reveals investing equally weighted in IPOs was preferable to investing value 
weighted between 1985 and 1995, while value weighted IPO investments performed better 
than equally weighted investments between 1996 und 2002. This allows further insights into 
                                                 
1   A critical reader might be surprised by the fact that mean BHARs to the CDAX in the entire sample period 
are higher than the sum of mean BHARs in the sub samples even though the whole sample period consists of 
both sub samples. The rationale is that in the first sub period, the return series of IPOs are cut after December 
1995. In the entire sample period the return series of firms that went public till December 1995 are 
considered completely. IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  14 
 
the relation between size and long-run performance. Consistent with Stehle (1997) who 
provides evidence for a size-effect in Germany, weighting each IPO equally results in lower 
underperformance in the first sub-period. In turn, this implies that the average 
underperformance of investment strategy 1 is mainly caused by large IPOs. In the second sub 
period, however, small IPOs are the main drivers of the average underperformance as strategy 
1 performs worse than strategy 2. 
Further, we analyse the relation between 
S
H BHAR  and the length of the holding period. Figure 
1 shows the long-run performance of all IPOs compared to the CDAX and the ewDAFOX for 
holding periods between 1 and 60 months. The upper graph plots the long-run abnormal 
performance of equally weighted IPOs, while the lower graph plots the long-run abnormal 
performance if IPOs are weighted according to their market value at the end of the IPO 
month. Bold black lines illustrate the IPO performance compared to the CDAX, dashed black 
lines the performance compared to the ewDAFOX and hatched grey lines the performance to 
the CDAX if outliers are excluded. Note that these graphs resemble, but do not exactly mirror 
investment strategies 1 and 2. Here, a data point for a certain holding period H only comprises 
IPOs whose return series is long enough to compute a BHARH,i. For example, the 
S
BHAR60 
comprises 601 IPOs.  
The upper graph reveals that IPOs outperform their benchmarks by roughly 20% for short 
holding periods. The outperformance to the CDAX illustrated by the bold black line is highly 
significant for holding periods between 2 and 12 months. Only after three years IPOs perform 
worse than the CDAX. We observe highly significant underperformance to the CDAX for 
holding periods between 42 and 46 months as well as for holding periods greater than 50 
months. The IPO performance to the ewDAFOX is similar for holding periods up to 20 
months. Thereafter, the IPOs perform worse on average than compared to the CDAX. The 
hatched grey line provides further insights into the drivers of the IPO performance as it 
represents the IPO performance to the CDAX if three extreme outliers are excluded. These 
outliers are Ballmaier & Schulz Wertpapier AG (B&S), a securities broker, Mobilcom AG, a 
mobile telecommunication provider and EM.TV & Merchandising AG, a multimedia firm. 
B&S went public in July 1994 and experienced an extreme stock price jump in spring 1998 
resulting in a BHAR of 3,746% after 47 months. The lack of significance of the 
underperformance between 45 and 47 months reflects the B&S stock price jump. Mobilcom 
went public in March 1997 and experienced a very favourable stock price performance 
culminating in a BHAR of 2,474% after 22 months. The EM.TV stocks that were taken public 
in October 1997 reached the highest relative price levels in the IPO sample culminating in a 
BHAR of 27,820% after 28 months. The deviation of the hatched grey line from the bold 
black line between 10 and 44 months reflects the extreme performance of Mobilcom and 
EM.TV. Without these two outliers, IPOs would have performed worse than the CDAX after 
a holding period of 18 months yet. Excluding all outliers, the IPO underperformance almost 
monotonically increases in the holding period. 
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Figure 1: Average BHAR in relation to the holding period 
 
The upper graph plots 
1
T BHAR if IPOs are weighted equally. The lower graph plots 
2
T BHAR  if IPOs are weighted 
according to their market value at the end of the IPO month. Bold black lines illustrate the performance of IPOs 
compared to the CDAX. Dashed black lines illustrate the performance of IPOs to the ewDAFOX. Hatched grey 
lines illustrate the performance of IPOs compared to the CDAX if the following three outliers are excluded: 
Ballmaier & Schultz Wertpapier AG, Frankfurt, Mobilcom AG, Büdelsdorf and EM.TV & Merchandising AG, 
Unterföhring. Curly braces indicate holding periods associated with a significant out- or underperformance 
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As the lower graph shows, weighting each IPO according to its market value generates a very 
different picture. Here, IPOs only slightly outperform the CDAX or the ewDAFOX for 
holding periods up to six month. Holding each IPO longer than six month yields a worse 
average performance than investing in the benchmarks except for holding periods between 35 
and 43 months in case of the CDAX and between 36 and 42 month in case of the ewDAFOX, 
respectively. Again, results are driven by an extreme outlier, which is Deutsche Telekom AG 
in this case. Although Deutsche Telekom was only the third largest IPO by market value in 
Germany, it reached the highest overall market value in our sample by far. Deutsche 
Telekom’s value culminated in 186.2 billion € 39 months after the IPO in February 2000 
which is consistent with the peak of the IPO performance relative to the CDAX after 39 
months. Excluding this outlier, the value weighted performance of IPOs is similar to the 
equally weighted performance in the sense that the value weighted performance increases in 
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the holding period, too. The level of underperformance is higher in case of equally weighted 
IPOs for holding periods greater than 27 months. 
2.4 IPO-portfolio  investment  strategies 
Investors pursuing IPO investment strategies 3 and 4 do not invest in each IPO, but in a 
portfolio that comprises firms that went public recently. The IPO portfolio may either be 
equally weighted (strategy 3) or value weighted (strategy 4). The meaning of “recently” may 
be arbitrarily concretised by choosing a certain formation period. We concentrate on 
formation periods of 36 and 60 months which is in line with the holding periods in strategies 
1 and 2. With strategies 3 and 4, investors put money into the IPO portfolio only once at the 
beginning of the investment period. At the end of each month the investors rebalance the IPO 
portfolio by including firms that went public this month and by taking out firms for which the 
time since IPO exceeds the formation period. In addition, strategy 3 requires monthly 
rebalancing in order to keep the portfolio equally weighted. Transaction costs associated with 
portfolio rebalancing are not incorporated in our analysis. As discussed in the introduction, we 
assume individual investors implement investment strategies 3 and 4 if they can purchase 
investment funds or certificates that duplicate the IPO portfolio at low transaction costs. 
We calculate the excess return  of investment strategies S={3,4} for a formation 
period of F months and a sample period of τ = Τ calendar months as  
S
F BHAR Τ ,
 
























































F R w R w BHAR    (3)     
where 
Ri,τ = return of firm i in calendar month τ,  
Rb,t,τ = return of the benchmark portfolio b for firm i in calendar month τ,  
NF,τ = number of firms that went public in the F months prior to calendar month τ, 
wi,τ = 1 in case of each IPO is weighted equally (strategy 3) and  
wi,τ = market value of firm i in calendar month τ divided by the sum of the market 
values of all firms NF,τ in calendar month τ (strategy 4). 
As with strategies 1 and 2, we test the null hypothesis  = 0 against the alternative 
hypothesis ≠ 0. In contrast to strategies 1 and 2, we do not have a distribution of 
abnormal returns that could serve as a basis for statistical tests. When calculating strategy 3’s 
and 4’s performance according to expression (3), we obtain a single data point instead. We 
apply a bootstrapping procedure in order to generate an empirical distribution of   
that may serve as a basis for statistical inference. We proceed as follows: From our entire 
S
F BHAR Τ ,
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sample period of 215 calendar months we randomly draw a new sample of 215 months. We 
calculate the   of the newly generated sample period from the empirical IPO portfolio 
and benchmark returns associated with the calendar months in the randomly drawn sample. 
This procedure is repeated 10,000 times. We can now use the empirical distribution of X = 
10,000   to test the null hypothesis. In order to determine the critical values of the 
empirical distribution, we sort the   in ascending order where 
. For a significance level α the critical values are equal to 
 and  , respectively. As the empirical distribution of 
 is asymmetric due to the multiplicative combination of monthly returns, we mirror 
the critical values on the mean of the distribution of   according to the percentile 
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hypothesis is rejected if all   within the range clow and chigh are greater than zero or 
smaller than zero, respectively. P-values indicate the smallest α and hence widest range 
[clow,chigh] for which the null hypothesis is rejected. We proceed in the same way in case of the 
sub sample periods. 
, F Τ
Table 4: Strategy 3 and 4 BHARs for holding periods of 36 and 60 months 
BHARs are calculated according to expression (3). P-values are based on empirical distributions of BHARs 
generated by 10,000 bootstrapped resamples of the original sample of calendar months. P-values indicate the 
smallest significance level α and hence widest range [clow,chigh] for which the null hypothesis is rejected. Τ 
indicates the number of calendar months in the (sub) sample. 
        Strategy 3    Strategy 4 
Benchmark       ewDAFOX    CDAX 
Formation period       36  60    36  60 
85-02  BHAR    -251.23%  -265.73%    -179.33%  -194.60% 
Τ = 215  p-value    0.2362  0.1794    0.3164  0.2648 
85-95  BHAR    -67.56%  -79.88%    -109.39%  -105.37% 
Τ = 131  p-value    0.2508  0.1984    0.2486  0.2524 
96-02  BHAR    -71.76%  -68.16%    -42.28%  -45.38% 
Τ = 78  p-value    0.3218  0.3558    0.8304  0.4886 
 
Table 4 shows buy-and-hold abnormal returns of investment strategies 3 and 4 for formation 
periods of 36 and 60 months. We analyse the performance of the equal weighting strategy 3 in 
comparison to the equally weighted ewDAFOX and the performance of the value weighting 
strategy 4 to the value weighted CDAX. Note that the number of calendar months Τ does not 
equal the number of years in the sample period times twelve as we observe the first calendar 
month IPO return in February 1985. In the sub sample 1996-2002 we observe the first 
calendar month IPO return in July 1996. In case of the entire sample period, the buy-and-hold 
return of the IPO portfolio is considerably lower than the buy-and-hold return of the 
benchmark portfolio. For example, pursuing strategy 3 yields a difference of IPO return and 
benchmark return of more than -265% for 60 months holding periods.  IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  18 
 
Consistent with our findings for strategies 1 and 2, the equally weighted IPO investment 
strategy performs worse than the value weighted strategy. The underperformance of the 60 
months formation period differs only slightly from the 36 months formation period. This 
contrasts to the impact of holding periods on the performance of strategies 1 and 2. In spite of 
the large underperformance, the p-values obtained by bootstrapping indicate no statistical 
significance. The BHARs for the sub sample periods are negative, too, even though the 
absolute level of underperformance is substantially lower. In the first sub period strategy 4 
performs worse than strategy 3, while in the second sub period strategy 4 outperforms. This 
indicates that small IPOs perform disproportionately well in the first sub period and 
disproportionately poorly in the second sub period which is consistent with our findings for 
strategies 1 and 2. Again, the sub sample BHARs are not statistically significant. 
It appears that strategies 3 and 4 are very unattractive to investors as regards the large 
underperformance observed in our sample periods. However, we can infer from the non-
significant p-values that strategies 3 and 4 are not unattractive in general. In addition, we can 
conclude that strategies 3 and 4 are more attractive than strategies 1 and 2 as the latter 
strategies performed significantly worse than their benchmark in many cases. This somewhat 
curious result is confirmed in Table 5. Here, we compare the monthly mean abnormal 
performance of the equal weighting strategies 1 and 3. We obtain monthly means for strategy 
1 as follows: For each IPO we calculate the monthly mean abnormal return by subtracting the 
monthly geometric mean of IPO returns from the monthly geometric mean return of the 
benchmark portfolio. The monthly mean abnormal returns are the arithmetic averages of the 
IPO mean abnormal returns in the different settings. For strategy 3, we calculate monthly 
mean abnormal returns as geometric averages of the monthly abnormal returns in the sample 
periods. We find negative monthly mean abnormal returns with strategy 1 as well as with 
strategy 3. Yet, the magnitude of monthly underperformance with strategy 1 is a multiple of 
the strategy 3 underperformance for the entire sample period and the later sub sample period. 
In sub period 1985 to 1995 strategy 1 monthly underperformance is still greater than that of 
strategy 3. Strategy 1 monthly mean abnormal returns are highly significant in any case, while 
strategy 3 monthly mean abnormal returns are significant in no case. These results strongly 
support our findings for the performance of investment strategies.  
Recall that the performance of all investment strategies is calculated by the very same 
monthly returns of the IPOs and the benchmarks, respectively. Thus, any difference in 
performance among strategies must be due to the different methods of aggregating monthly 
returns defined by expressions (2) and (3). Strategies 1 and 2 imply an equal (respectively 
market value) weighting of each IPO irrespective of calendar months, while strategies 3 and 4 
imply an equal weighting of calendar month irrespective of the number of IPOs in a calendar 
month. In the latter strategies, each IPO’s weight in a calendar month return depends on the 
number of IPOs in the formation period of that calendar month. It follows that the more firms 
go public within a certain formation period, the less weight is attributed to each IPO. 
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Table 5: Monthly mean abnormal returns of strategies 1 and 3 
Months specifies the length of the holding period in case of strategy 1 and the length of the formation period in 
case of strategy 3. In case of strategy 1, mean refers to the arithmetic mean of the monthly mean abnormal 
returns of the IPOs in the sample where the monthly mean abnormal return of each IPO is calculated by 
subtracting the monthly geometric mean of IPO returns from the monthly geometric mean return of the 
benchmark portfolio. In case of strategy 3, mean refers to the geometric mean of the monthly abnormal returns 
in each sample period. P-values are based on t-statistics in case of strategy 1. P-values are based on t-statistics 
of the log-transformed distribution of the monthly returns in case of strategy 3. N specifies the number of IPOs 
in the sample period of strategy 1. T specifies the number of calendar months in the sample period of   strategy 
3. 
         Strategy 1    Strategy 3 
Benchmark     CDAX    ewDAFOX    CDAX     ewDAFOX 
Months     36  60    36  60    36  60     36  60 
85-02  Mean     -3.43%  -3.60%    -4.08%  -4.40%    -0.57%  -0.65%     -0.57%  -0.64% 
   p-value  0.0000  0.0000    0.0000  0.0000    0.1506  0.0704     0.1247  0.0541 
   N / T     667  667    667  667    215  215     215  215 
85-95  Mean     -0.38%  -0.58%    -0.26%  -0.42%    -0.25%  -0.29%     -0.22%  -0.27% 
   p-value   0.0035  0.0000    0.0492  0.0023    0.5984  0.4817     0.1924  0.1037 
   N / T     196  196    196  196    131  131     131  131 
96-02  Mean     -4.62%  -4.75%    -5.52%  -5.90%    -0.99%  -0.91%     -1.09%  -1.00% 
   p-value   0.0000  0.0000    0.0000  0.0000    0.2536  0.2756     0.2670  0.2830 
   N / T     471  471    471  471    78  78     78  78 
 
As we observe significant underperformance with strategies 1 and 2 but not with strategies 3 
and 4, we can infer that IPOs performed disproportionately poorly in periods of high issuance 
activity. This pattern is consistent with international evidence that IPOs in hot markets 
perform worse than IPOs in cold markets (e.g., see Helwege and Liang 2004). This leads over 
to section III which discusses Pseudo Market Timing as an explanation for the differences in 
underperformance among investment strategies. 
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3  Pseudo Market Timing in Germany 
3.1  Market Timing vs. Pseudo Market Timing  
Market timing describes a manager’s ability to explicitly time a going public into a period of 
irrational overvaluation of his firm, the firm’s industry or the entire stock market. As a matter 
of fact, two out of three CFOs responding to a survey by Graham and Harvey (2001) confirm 
the considerable influence of over- or undervaluation on the decision to go public. 
Two phenomena are frequently considered to be empirical indicators for IPO market timing in 
the literature. First, IPOs cluster at market peaks or in times of high market-to-book ratios of 
comparable firms. Second, firms going public at market peaks or in times of high IPO activity 
perform considerably worse than firms going public at other times.1 Our comparison of each-
IPO investment strategies to IPO-portfolio investment strategies suggests the same 
phenomena for German IPOs. Regarding these phenomena, Ritter (1991) was the first to 
suppose that managers identify periods of overvaluation of IPOs („windows of opportunity“) 
and choose such periods to go public. However, neither a concentration of IPOs at market 
peaks nor long-term negative abnormal returns of IPOs around market peaks necessitate that 
the managers have indeed identified a peak and knowingly time the market.2 If managers were 
able to identify overvaluations, IPO activity could predict future returns. Loughran, Ritter and 
Rydqvist (1994) find little evidence for an ability of IPO activity to forecast future returns in 
different countries. Baker and Wurgler (2000) provide evidence that the proportion of equity 
issuance in total securities issuance predicts future equity returns in the US. Apart from using 
IPO clustering and performance as an indicator for market timing, market timing could be 
tested based on a measure of investor sentiment that indicates market overvaluations.3 Lee, 
Shleifer and Thaler (1991) use the closed-end fund discount as an indicator of investor 
sentiment where low discounts point to overvaluations. Indeed, they find that more firms go 
public at times of a low closed-end fund discount. Their result is confirmed by Lowry (2003). 
 
1   Loughran/Ritter (1995, 2000), Webb (1999) and Helwege/Liang (2004) find evidence for the US market, 
Keloharju (1993) for the Finnish market and Page/Reyneke (1997) for the South-African capital market. 
Lerner (1994) shows that venture capitalists predominantly take their firms public at market peaks. 
2   Löffler (2000) notes that managers decide to go public approximately six month prior to the actual IPO date. 
Hence, market timing implies that managers predict overvaluations half a year in advance which is an even 
more difficult task. 
3   An overvaluation of IPOs on the secondary market could be the consequence of an irrational investors’ 
behaviour on the primary market. In a survey by Shiller (1990), only 43% of US investors stated to subscribe 
for IPOs on the basis of fundamentals. 57% subscribe because of attractive products or promising strategic 
concepts of the firms. Loughran and Ritter (2003) suppose that investors were subject to herding behavior 
during the internet bubble. An IPO oversubscription due to irrational investors on the primary market could 
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Rajan and Servaes (1997) find that IPO activity is positively correlated with analysts’ 
optimism about the growth prospects of recent IPOs. 
In contrast to the findings described above, other studies find phenomena and behaviour 
patterns on US capital markets that contradict the market timing hypothesis. For instance, on 
the basis of data about insider-trading, Lee (1997) shows that managers buy shares prior to 
price declines. This is contradictory if managers have market timing abilities. Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1999) find stock underperformance following to debt issuance. According to 
market timing, firms issue equity in times of overvaluation and debt in times of 
undervaluation. Thus, market timing implies outperformance after debt issues.  
There is little evidence for market timing in Germany. For instance, Rehkugler and Schenek 
(2001) have to reject the market timing hypothesis as they find larger underperformance for 
firms that went public in periods of low IPO activity. Similarly at odds with market timing, 
Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) detect a positive correlation between the number of 
IPOs and future returns. Rath, Tebroke and Tietze (2004) analyse the correlation between 
market sentiment at the date of the IPOs on Neuer Markt and their long-run performance. 
Amongst others, they apply business climate indices as indicators for market sentiment. 
Consistent with market timing, they find worse performance for firms that went public in 
times of a positive market sentiment. 
Schultz (2003) shows that a concentration of IPOs around market peaks and long-run negative 
abnormal returns of IPOs are not necessarily a consequence of managers timing the market 
und hence, a consequence of market inefficiencies. Instead, in efficient capital markets 
negative abnormal returns of IPOs can be observed if the following conditions hold: The 
probability of a going public increases with the price level of the market and of recent IPOs in 
particular. Further, excess returns of recent IPOs in a calendar month need to be positively 
correlated. In this case, IPO clustering at market peaks might be misleadingly perceived as 
market timing. Schultz (2003) finds that this pseudo market timing can explain the level of 
long-run underperformance observed in the US in event time. Butler, Grullon and Weston 
(2005) attribute the predictive power of the proportion of equity issuance found by Baker and 
Wurgler (2000) to pseudo market timing. 
The first condition states that managers or owners take the price level of a benchmark 
portfolio into account when deciding about an IPO. The entire stock market, a benchmark 
firm or a portfolio of recent IPOs could serve as appropriate benchmark portfolios. The 
assumption that managers consider absolute price levels instead of relative performance prior 
to an IPO can be rationalised as follows:1 An increasing market price level or increasing price 
levels of particular industries imply new investment opportunities. These investments have to 
be funded at least partly by equity. Thus, IPO activity should be positively correlated with 
 
1   Pastor/Veronesi (2005) provide evidence for a positive correlation between IPO activity and the market 
returns rather than market price levels. IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  22 
 
price levels. Regardless of the underlying investment opportunities, an IPO’s attractiveness 
rises with increasing expected proceeds. Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) provide 
empirical evidence for a positive correlation between IPO activity and stock market price 
levels in several countries. Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) detect a positive correlation 
between the probability of Italian firms to go public and the market value of firms in the same 
industry. Pastor and Veronesi (2005) find a positive correlation between the valuation of IPOs 
relative to the entire market valuation and IPO activity. Secondly, pseudo market timing 
requires a positive correlation among the abnormal returns of recent IPOs in a calendar month 
in order to observe fluctuations of the aggregate price level of IPOs in excess of fluctuations 
of market price levels. As IPOs of firms within a certain industry cluster in certain time 
periods, a positive correlation of abnormal returns is plausible. 
If managers behave as described above, IPOs concentrate in bullish markets even if managers 
do not possess timing abilities. In other words: Even though managers are ex ante not able to 
predict a market peak and hence a trend reversal in share prices, ex post it seems as if 
managers time the market as IPOs cluster around market peaks. However, this clustering does 
not reflect any superior abilities of managers, owners or investment bankers to identify 
periods of overvaluations. Market timing is simply a statistical illusion. Hence, Schultz calls 
this phenomenon pseudo market timing. If managers behave as predicted by pseudo market 
timing, and the second condition concerning the correlation of IPO returns holds, negative 
long-run performance of IPOs will be observed when averaging over all IPOs irrespective of 
the market’s efficiency. Thus, pseudo market timing predicts that investment strategies 1 and 
2 underperform in the long-run which is in line with our empirical findings. If each calendar 
month is weighted equally, however, IPOs do not underperform their benchmarks in efficient 
capital markets as a clustering of IPOs is irrelevant in an analysis based on calendar time. 
Thus, pseudo market timing predicts that strategies 3 and 4 do not underperform their 
benchmarks. Indeed, we observe underperformance of strategies 3 and 4, but not on a 
statistically significant level.  
In the following we illustrate the basic intuition of pseudo market timing on the basis of a 
simple model consisting of three periods. In this model, the IPO activity in one period is 
positively correlated to the price level of IPOs which took place in the previous period. In 
particular, we assume the following relation: If the prices of the previous period’s IPOs are 
below 60, no IPOs will take place. If the previous period’s IPOs quote at least at 60 [80, 100, 
120, 140], 1 [2, 4, 8, 12] firms will go public. The arrangement of categories and the number 
of IPOs in each category is arbitrary and irrelevant for the verification of pseudo market 
timing as long as the number of IPOs rises in higher categories. Following the example in 
Schultz (2003), we further assume an expected market return of 0%. In each period, IPOs 
either earn an excess return (ER) of +20% or -20%, each with a probability of 50% which 
implies that IPO returns are perfectly positively correlated. As the expected abnormal return 
of IPOs equals 0%, the market is efficient ex ante. In t=0, we assume that the previous 
period’s IPOs quote at 100. The resulting 2³ = 8 potential IPO price paths in the following 
three periods are illustrated in Table 6.  IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  23 
 
Table 6: A simple example for pseudo market timing 
The expected market return amounts to 0%. In the period following the IPO, the IPOs earn an abnormal return 
of +20% or -20%, each with a probability of 50%. The IPO activity depends on the price level of the previous 
period’s IPOs as follows: If the previous period’s IPOs quote below 60, there are no IPOs. If the price of the 
previous period’s IPOs exceeds 60 [80, 100, 120, 140], 1 [2, 4, 8, 12] firms will go public. 
1
1 BHAR  indicates 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return for single holding periods if each IPO is weighted equally (strategy 1). 
3
3 , 1 BHAR  indicates Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns for a single formation period over three sample periods if 
each time period is weighted equally (strategy 3). 
   t0       t1        t2       t3    




IPOs   
ER 












t2 - t3 
IPO-





3 , 1 BHAR
 
1     100  5     20%  120  8    20%  144  12    20%  172.8     20%  72.8% 
2     100  5     20%  120  8    20%  144  12    -20%  115.2     1%  15.2% 
3     100  5     20% 120  8   -20% 96  2   20%  115.2      -1%  15.2% 
4     100  5     20% 120  8   -20% 96  2   -20%  76.8      -7%  -23.2%
5     100  5     -20% 80  2   20%  96  2   20%  115.2      -2%  15.2% 
6     100  5     -20% 80  2   20%  96  2   -20%  76.8      -11%  -23.2%
7     100  5     -20% 80  2   -20% 64  1   20% 76.8      -15%  -23.2%
8     100  5     -20% 80  2   -20% 64  1   -20%  51.2      -20%  -48.8%
Mean     -4.4% 0%
Probability of negative abnormal returns     75.0% 50.0%
 
For reasons of simplicity we assume each IPO is held for a single period and the IPO portfolio 
is formed by the IPOs of a single period, respectively. The long-run performance of an IPO is 
thus given by the buy-and-hold abnormal return of the first period of its quotation. The 
1
3
1 BHAR  of an each-IPO investment strategy is given by the mean abnormal return of the IPOs 
on a price path. The   of an IPO-portfolio investment strategy is given by the mean 
abnormal return of a price path in the three periods. As an example, consider price path 3: It is 
assumed that in t0 the prices of the previous IPOs are 100, thus five firms will go public. In 
the first period (t0-t1) these firms’ prices increase by 20% to 120. Thereon, eight firms will go 
public in t1. In the second period these IPOs’ prices decrease by 20% to 96. It follows that 
only two firms will go public in t2. Their positive performance motivates five firms to go 
public in t3. In price path 3 six IPOs outperform the market by 20% each, while eight IPOs 
underperform the market by 20%. Hence, the average abnormal return amounts to -1% in case 
of investment strategy 1. In case of investment strategy  3, the average abnormal return 
amounts to +7% as we observe abnormal returns of +20% in two periods and an abnormal 
return of -20% in one period. Summing over all price paths yields negative mean abnormal 
returns in case of strategy 1 and no abnormal performance in case of strategy 3. 
3 , 1 BHAR
In addition, Table 6 presents the probability of negative abnormal returns in case of strategies 
1 and 3. As abnormal returns of six out of eight possible price paths are negative in case of 
strategy 1, the probability to observe negative abnormal returns is 75% although the ex ante 
expected abnormal return for each IPO equals 0%. The negative abnormal returns observed ex IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  24 
 
post are caused by pseudo market timing. Note that this result only holds if the IPOs are held 
for a single period. For holding periods exceeding one time period, the probability to observe 
negative abnormal returns exceeds 50% regardless of pseudo market timing if IPO returns are 
more volatile than benchmark returns. This follows from the multiplicative combination of 
returns. In case of strategy 3, abnormal returns are negative in four out of eight price paths. In 
general, however, the probability to observe negative abnormal returns also increases above 
50% for sample periods greater than one time period. Nevertheless, for strategy 1 holding 
period lengths equal to strategy 3 sample period lengths, the probability to observe negative 
abnormal returns is even greater in case of strategy 1 if managers behave as presumed by 
pseudo market timing. 
The extent of negative abnormal returns in the each-IPO investment strategies depends on the 
variance of IPO returns to market returns. For instance, if abnormal returns amount to +50% 
or -50% with a probability of 50% each, 
1
1 BHAR  drops to -20,5%. The probability to observe 
negative abnormal returns is not influenced by the variance of IPO returns, but depends on the 
IPO activity’s sensitivity to the price level. Note that hot IPO markets, e.g. t1 in price paths 3 
and 4 and t2 in price path 2, are followed by negative abnormal returns. This follows as hot 
IPO markets are defined ex post, after negative abnormal returns decreased the number of 
IPOs and thereby created a peak in IPO activity. By definition, IPO markets are hot if and 
only if they are followed by negative abnormal returns that decrease price levels and thereby 
IPO activity. This constitutes the long-run underperformance of strategy 1. 
3.2  Price levels and IPO activity 
In order to analyse the ability of pseudo market timing to explain the performance difference 
of IPO investment strategies in Germany, we first estimate the extent to which managers or 
owners take price levels into account when deciding to go public. We use a multivariate 
regression model where the number of IPOs (NoIPOs) per month is the dependent variable. 
This requires a definition of the price level that influences a company’s decision to go public. 
We assume that managers or owners of companies consider the price level of the stock market 
in general. The higher the price level, the more optimistically investors assess investment 
opportunities of companies raising their willingness to provide funds. We apply the CDAX as 
a proxy for the price level of the German stock market. The CDAX is set to 100 in January 
1985. Furthermore, we assume that managers or owners will consider the performance of 
recent IPOs which indicates whether investors are willing to provide funds for companies 
going public. We presume that managers or owners consider the performance of IPOs dating 
back a maximum of three years. Starting with a level equal to 100 in January 1985, we 
compute a monthly equally weighted performance index consisting of companies whose IPOs 
date back a maximum of three years. A potential bias due to non-stationarity of the CDAX 
and the IPO index is mitigated by a time variable in the regression model. The time variable 
starts with one in the first calendar month and increases by one each following month.  
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⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = − − 6 4 3 3 2 1 0 t t t
II
t IPOx IPOx IPOx Time NoIPOs
The multivariate regression model I can be described as follows: 
ε α α α α + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = t t
I
t CDAX IPOx Time NoIPOs 3 2 1 0   .    (4) 
Since it takes several months to prepare a going public, it can be assumed that managers 
actually decide to go public up to six months before the first trading day. To capture this time 
lag, we model the number of IPOs depending on lagged price levels, too, by including the 
levels of the CDAX and the IPO index three and six months prior to calendar month t.  
The multivariate regression model II can be stated as follows: 
 
ε α α α + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + − − 6 7 3 6 5 t t t CDAX CDAX CDAX
  
        .    ( 5 )  
α α α α α
We separately estimate the regression models I and II for the time period 1985 to 2002 as well 
as for the two sub periods 1985 to 1995 and 1996 to 2002. Table 7 shows the results of an 
Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) regression estimation of models I and II. 
Looking at the results for the entire period 1985 to 2002, the coefficients for the IPO index 
and the CDAX are significantly positive in case of regression model I. This is consistent with 
the assumption of pseudo market timing: the higher the price level, the more firms go public. 
In regression model II the actual and lagged coefficients of the IPO index are significant, 
while those of the CDAX are not. This implies that managers rather look at price levels of 
recent IPOs than of the overall stock market when deciding to go public. The negative 
coefficients for the time variable in both regressions indicate that IPO activity would have 
decreased with constant IPO and CDAX levels. All in all, the explanatory power of regression 
model II is higher than that of regression model I which supports our view that the actual 
decision to go public is taken months before the first listing. 
The separate analysis of the two sub periods reveals that the factors influencing the decision 
to go public has changed since 1995. In the first sub period, the coefficients for both the IPO 
index and the CDAX in regression model I are positive, but only the CDAX coefficient is 
weakly significant. This can imply that the decision to go public between 1985 and 1995 was 
more correlated with the price level of the entire stock market than with recent IPOs. This 
conclusion is supported by the low IPO volume in this period. Regression model II reveals 
that actual CDAX levels and lagged IPO levels better explain the number of IPOs. The 
negative coefficients of IPOt, IPOt-6 and CDAXt-3 show that the relation between IPO activity 
and price levels is very sensitive to the time lags. In the second sub period, the IPO index 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant while the CDAX coefficient is negative and 
non-significant. With the increasing IPO activity since 1996 concentrating on a few industries 
like telecommunication and media only, managers put more weight on the performance of 
recent IPOs than on the entire stock market. The coefficient for the time variable is negative 
in the first period 1985 to 1995 and positive in the second sub period. With constant IPO IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  26 
 
index and CDAX levels IPO activity would have decreased between 1985 and 1995 and 
increased thereafter. This might indicate a change in the German stock market culture and in 
the attitude of managers to issuing equity. The adjusted R² of regression model II is 
significantly higher for the second period (52.0%) than for the first one (11.6%). Among other 
factors, this is a result of the low IPO activity between 1985 and 1995. While approximately 
5.6 companies went public per month between 1996 and 2002, there were only 1.5 IPOs per 
month in the first sub period.  
Table 7: OLS regression of IPO activity on an IPO index and the CDAX 
Ordinary Least-Squares regression of models I and II. The dependent variable in all regressions is the number of 
IPOs. Independent variables are a time variable, an equally weighted performance index of firms going public 
up to 36 months prior to t and the CDAX. Regression model II includes three months and six months lags for 
the IPO index and the CDAX to capture the time to prepare a going public. 
   Intercept Time  IPOt  IPOt-3  IPOt-6  CDAXt CDAXt-3 CDAXt-6  N  R² 
adj. 
R² 
1985-2002                                  
I
t NoIPOs   -2.560  -0.018  0.021      0.008      210  0.547 0.540
 p-value  0.000  0.032  0.000      0.070           
II
t NoIPOs   -2.379  -0.021  0.016  0.020  -0.020  0.000  0.009  0.004  210  0.605 0.592
 p-value  0.000  0.012  0.003  0.003  0.000  0.963  0.373  0.637       
1985-1995                                  
I
t NoIPOs   -1.616  -0.026  0.011      0.015      126  0.127 0.106
 p-value  0.086  0.000  0.110      0.077            
II
t NoIPOs   -1.562  -0.025  -0.013  0.058  -0.035  0.031  -0.039  0.024  126  0.166 0.116
 p-value  0.146  0.001  0.488  0.029  0.058  0.060  0.088  0.137       
1996-2002                                  
I
t NoIPOs   2.333  0.001  0.065      -0.042      84  0.493 0.471
 p-value  0.549  0.981  0.000      0.255           
II
t NoIPOs   3.481  0.036  0.043  0.044  -0.020  -0.034  0.021  -0.046  84  0.567 0.520
 p-value  0.455  0.481  0.018  0.045  0.285  0.417  0.655  0.345       
 
In addition, we estimate the relation between the number of IPOs and the price levels using 
the ewDAFOX as a measure of stock market levels. Using an equally weighted market index 
implies that managers weight each listed firm equally when evaluating the market price level. 
Table 8 summarises the estimations for the regression models I and II using the ewDAFOX 
(DFX in the table). For the entire sample period, the values and significance levels of 
coefficients differ only slightly from those in estimations using the CDAX as a measure of 
stock market levels. In contrast to the estimations in Table 7, the stock market proxy DFXt is 
not significant in model I and Time is not significant in both models. For the sub sample 
period 1985 to 1995, Table 8 shows that the coefficients of all explanatory variables are non-
significant which yields a low explanatory power of 8.3% in case of model I. The estimations 
for the sub period 1996 to 2002 using the ewDAFOX are similar to those using the CDAX.  IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  27 
 
Table 8: OLS regression of IPO activity on an IPO index and the ewDAFOX 
Ordinary Least-Squares regression of models I and II. The dependent variable in all regressions is the number of 
IPOs. Independent variables are a time variable, an equally weighted performance index of firms going public 
up to 36 months prior to t and the ewDAFOX (DFX). Regression model II includes three months and six months 
lags for the IPO index and the ewDAFOX to capture the time to prepare a going public. 
  Intercept  Time  IPOt  IPOt-3  IPOt-6  DFXt  DFXt-3 DFXt-6  N  R² 
adj. 
R² 
1985-2002                       
I
t NoIPOs   -2.877  -0.009  0.025      0.003      210  0.540 0.533
p-value  0.001  0.455  0.000      0.737           
II
t NoIPOs   -3.191  -0.014  0.018  0.022  -0.017  -0.007  0.013  0.001  210  0.592 0.578
p-value  0.000  0.324  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.558  0.391  0.905       
1985-1995                       
I
t NoIPOs   -0.674  -0.020  0.019      0.001      126  0.105 0.083
p-value  0.397  0.082  0.318      0.974           
II
t NoIPOs   -0.287  -0.022  0.023  0.029  -0.042  -0.007  -0.012  0.027  126  0.133 0.082
p-value  0.735  0.128  0.438  0.431  0.141  0.787  0.729  0.318       
1996-2002                       
I
t NoIPOs   1.646  -0.008  0.052      -0.029      84  0.485 0.463
p-value  0.797  0.811  0.000      0.604           
II
t NoIPOs   1.006  0.000  0.037  0.044  -0.033  -0.058  0.066  -0.029  84  0.561 0.514
p-value  0.896  1.000  0.007  0.022  0.019  0.407  0.439  0.699       
 
3.3  Simulating the IPO activity 
We simulate the long-run performance of German IPOs using the historical relation between 
the number of IPOs and the price level of both the recent IPOs and the stock market. To 
account for the changes in this relation since 1996, we simulate the long-run performance 
based on the relation in the entire sample as well as on the relation in both sub samples. We 
run separate simulations using the CDAX and the ewDAFOX as a proxy for the stock market. 
The simulations are based on the regression model having the highest explanatory power in 
the OLS estimation for a certain setting. This is regression model II apart from sub sample 
1985 to 1995 using the ewDAFOX. Since the principal methodology of simulating IPO 
activity is the same for all settings, we describe the simulation based on the historical data for 
the total sample of 18 years (1985 to 2002) using the CDAX as a proxy for the stock market 
in the following.  
First, we generate a market index for a sample path of 216 months. The monthly returns of 
this market index are drawn from a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation 
equivalent to the historical parameters of the CDAX. The monthly mean return on the CDAX 
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starts with 100 in each sample path. In order to construct an IPO index, we first estimate the 
relation between monthly returns of the actual strategy 3 IPO portfolio and monthly CDAX 
returns using an OLS regression model. This yields a slope coefficient of 0.90 and a standard 
error of 5.35%. The unadjusted return of the IPO index is generated by multiplying the 
simulated market return with the slope coefficient and adding an error term that is drawn from 
a normal distribution with zero mean and a standard deviation of 5.35%. As the slope 
coefficient is below one, the IPO portfolio yields systematically lower returns than the market. 
In order to analyse the sole effect of pseudo market timing on the performance of IPO 
investment strategies in Germany, we adjust each IPO index return so that the expected return 
of the IPO portfolio equals the expected return of the market, which is 0.69% in the setting 
described here. The unadjusted expected IPO returns equals 0.69%*0.90=0.62%. Thus, we 
add 0.07% to the IPO return in each month. In general, the adjustment term is derived by 
subtracting the product of the slope coefficient and the expected market return from the 
expected market return. The IPO index starts with 100 in each sample path.  
Finally, the number of IPOs per month in a simulated market is estimated by the regression 
models I and II, respectively. We simulate the IPO activity in 50,000 capital markets in each 
setting. Table 9 summarises the parameters for the simulation of the market index and the IPO 
index in all settings. 
Table 9: Parameters for simulating IPO activity 
Slope coefficient and standard deviation of residuals are derived from an OLS regression with the monthly 
return of the historical strategy 3 IPO portfolio as the dependent variable and market return as the independent 
variable. Mean return and standard deviation of the monthly market returns are calculated from the historical 
data. The adjustment term is derived by subtracting the slope coefficient times the expected market return from 
the expected market return. 
Benchmark    
Slope 
coefficient    
P-value of 
slope 
coefficient   
Standard 
deviation 







index return    
Adjustment 
term 
CDAX                 
1985 - 2002    0.90    0.000  5.35% 0.69%  6.15%    0.07% 
1985 - 1995    0.70    0.000  2.66% 0.86%  5.65%    0.26% 
1996 - 2002    1.14    0.000  8.47% 0.31%  7.09%    -0.04% 
ewDAFOX               
1985 - 2002    1.23    0.000  5.80% 0.66%  4.09%    -0.15% 
1985 - 1995    0.72    0.000  1.65% 0.86%  4.34%    0.24% 
1996 - 2002     1.85     0.000   9.50%    0.28%    3.77%     -0.24% 
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3.4 Investment  strategy  performance in simulated markets 
3.4.1  Each-IPO investment strategies 
Knowing the number of IPOs in each month of a simulated sample period we calculate the 
buy-and-hold abnormal return of each IPO in the simulated market according to expression 
(1). We assume that all IPOs realise the same return in each calendar months, which is the 
return of the IPO portfolio. This implies a perfectly positive correlation among IPO returns in 
each calendar month. Based on the individual IPO’s buy-and-hold abnormal performance, we 
compute the mean buy-and-hold abnormal return of IPOs according to expression (2). As our 
simulations yield the number of IPOs per month but not the market value of each IPO, we 
assume equal market values of all IPOs. Incorporating market values in the simulations 
properly requires an analysis as to whether the market values of IPOs are endogeneous to 
price levels, IPO activity or other variables. These questions are left to future research.  
Note that by construction, the expected value of the IPO index equals the expected value of 
the market index irrespective of the length of the sample period. Thus, any abnormal 
performance of investment strategy 1 cannot be traced back to a misspecification of the 
benchmark portfolio, but to pseudo market timing. Table 10 presents mean BHARs of IPOs in 
the 50000 simulated capital markets compared to the CDAX and the ewDAFOX, 
respectively.  
Table 10: Average performance of strategy 1 in simulated capital markets 
Mean is calculated as the average of the mean BHARs of the 50,000 simulated capital markets where the mean 
BHAR in each simulation is calculated as the average of the BHARs of the IPOs in this simulated market 
according to expression (2). Std. deviation denotes the standard deviation of BHARs. P-values are based on 
skewness adjusted t-statistics. 
Benchmark        CDAX    ewDAFOX 
Holding period     36    60    36     60 
1985-2002  Mean     -3.68%    -6.00%    -8.37%     -13.60% 
  Std. deviation    14.57%    23.76%  15.78%    25.74% 
   p-value     < 0.0001    < 0.0001    < 0.0001     < 0.0001 
1985-1995  Mean     2.00%    3.16%     0.38%     0.61% 
  Std. deviation    11.00%    18.16%  7.31%    12.59% 
   p-value     < 0.0001    < 0.0001    < 0.0001     < 0.0001 
1996-2002  Mean     -8.54%    -10.71%     -10.64%     -13.15% 
  Std. deviation    30.51%    43.97%  32.18%    46.05% 
   p-value     < 0.0001    < 0.0001    < 0.0001     < 0.0001 
 
In simulations based on the sample period 1985 to 2002, IPOs significantly underperform the 
respective market index for holding periods of 36 and 60 months. This partly resembles the IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  30 
 
empirical findings for strategy 1 in the entire sample period. Consistent with the empirical 
findings, IPOs perform worse in case of 60 months holding periods. However, the simulations 
understate the absolute level of underperformance observed empirically by more than 25 
percentage points. In case of 36 months holding periods, the simulations overstate the 
absolute level of underperformance slightly. In contrast to the empirical findings, the 
simulations show highly significant underperformance after 36 months. The simulations based 
on the sub sample period 1985 to 1995 yield highly significant positive mean BHARs 
compared to the respective market index, although most of the IPO index and market index 
coefficients are positive in the OLS regressions. This remarkable finding can be attributed to 
the slope coefficients of IPO returns to the respective market returns being well below one. 
Such slope coefficients imply that if the market decreases, IPOs tend to decrease to a lesser 
extent. This yields positive abnormal returns in bearish markets. Generally, the performance 
of investment strategy 1 in simulated markets is at odds with the empirical findings which can 
also be attributed to the low explanatory of the regression models. The performance of 
investment strategy 1 in the simulations based on the second sub sample period are similar to 
those of the entire sample period. Simulations yield highly significant underperformance in 
case of both holding periods. Again, IPOs perform worse if held for up to 60 months. These 
results are generally in line with the empirical findings, even though underperformance after 
36 months is overstated while underperformance after 60 months is understated. Regardless of 
the simulated sample period, investment strategy 1 performs worse in comparison to the 
ewDAFOX than to the CDAX. This is consistent with our empirical findings. 
The simulations show that pseudo market timing can explain part of the long-run 
underperformance of IPOs observed in Germany between 1985 and 2002. Depending on the 
benchmark portfolio and the holding period, between 16% and 75% of the underperformance 
of investment strategy 1 can be attributed to pseudo market timing. Dividing the entire sample 
period into sub sample periods reveals that pseudo market timing was predominantly a 
phenomenon of firms going public between 1996 and 2002 in Germany. We find little 
evidence that managers acted according to pseudo market timing between 1985 and 1995. 
This is a consequence of the weak relation between IPO activity and price levels in this 
period. 
3.4.2  IPO-portfolio investment strategies 
For each simulated capital market, we calculate the performance of an IPO-portfolio 
investment strategy according to expression (3). Again, we solely analyse the performance of 
strategy 3 in the simulated capital markets as we do not have information on IPO market 
values. From the assumption that each IPO earns the return of the simulated IPO index in a 
particular calendar month it follows that the length of the formation period does not affect 
results. Since the formation period only alters the number of IPOs considered in the portfolio 
in a calendar month, it is irrelevant in an analysis of portfolio performance if each IPO earns 
exactly the same return per calendar month. Thus, Table 11 presents the mean BHARs of IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  31 
 
investment strategy 3 in the 50000 simulated capital markets irrespective of the formation 
period. 
Table 11: Average performance of strategy 3 in simulated capital markets 
Mean is calculated as the average BHAR of IPO-portfolio investment strategy 3 in each simulated capital 
market. The BHAR in each simulated market is calculated according to expression (3). Standard deviation 
denotes the standard deviation of the 50,000 BHARs. Std. deviation denotes the standard deviation of BHARs. 
P-values are based on skewness-adjusted t-statistics. 
Benchmark        CDAX     ewDAFOX 
1985-2002  Mean     -3.56%     -1.94% 
   Std. deviation     526.94%     548.52% 
   p-value     0.1358     0.4369 
1985-1995  Mean     -0.22%     -0.22% 
   Std. deviation     129.05%     80.07% 
   p-value     0.7071     0.5370 
1996-2002  Mean     -0.72%     -1.03% 
   Std. deviation     136.47%     153.97% 
   p-value     0.2407     0.1433 
 
By construction, the mean BHAR of investment strategy 3 should equal zero. Indeed, we find 
non-significant average BHARs close to zero in each sample period. The slight deviations 
from zero are caused by chance as the multiplicative combination of the return series causes 
very high standard deviations. Extreme outliers are not even fully averaged out after 50,000 
simulations. Overall, the performance of IPO investment strategies in simulated markets is in 
line with the performance observed empirically except for the sub period 1985 to 1995. IPO Investment Strategies and Pseudo Market Timing  32 
 
4 Conclusion 
Based on a large sample of IPOs in Germany between 1985 and 2002, we analyse the 
performance of simple investment strategies in IPOs. In particular, we compare the 
performance of each-IPO investment strategies and IPO-portfolio investment strategies. 
Weighting each IPO equally in an each-IPO investment strategy yields non-significant 
underperformance if each IPO is held for three years. However, for a holding period of 5 
years this strategy highly significantly underperforms the CDAX and the equally weighted 
DAFOX. Weighting each IPO according to its market value yields highly significant 
underperformance even if each IPO is held for three years. In general, IPO underperformance 
increases with the length of the holding period. In order to control for institutional changes in 
the German primary markets and the evolution of a German equity culture since the mid-1990 
that might affect the long-run performance of IPOs, we separately analyse the sub sample 
periods 1985 to 1995 and 1996 to 2002. Investing in each IPO equally yields considerably 
worse performance in the second sub sample than in the first. However, this result changes in 
case of value weighted investments. This allows interesting insights into the cross-section of 
IPO performance. Between 1985 and 1995 small IPOs performed disproportionately well, 
while those IPOs performed disproportionately poorly between 1996 and 2002. IPO-portfolio 
investment strategies underperform their benchmarks, too. However, based on a bootstrapping 
methodology we do not find significant underperformance. 
The finding that each-IPO investment strategies significantly underperform benchmark 
investments while IPO-portfolio investment strategies do not points to the pseudo market 
timing phenomenon. Managers pseudo time the market if their willingness to go public 
increases with price levels. This behaviour causes long-run abnormal returns if monthly IPO 
returns are positively correlated. Simulations of IPO activity based on the historical relation 
between IPO activity and price levels show that pseudo market timing explains a small part of 
the underperformance of each-IPO investment strategies in the entire sample period. A 
separate analysis of the sub sample periods reveals that pseudo market timing has little 
explanatory power with respect to the performance of IPO investment strategies between 
1985 and 1995. However, pseudo market timing partly explains the IPO investment strategy 
performance between 1996 and 2002. Our results indicate considerable changes in the 
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